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Abstract: Outward foreign direct investment (FDI) from developing countries is increasing. In the 
research on FDI, it has been considered that only competitive and productive firms can invest in 
foreign countries. However, since the differences in competitiveness and productivity between 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) from developed and developing countries have not been 
explicitly investigated, we cannot say whether MNEs from developing countries can or cannot 
survive in competition with MNEs from developed countries as well as against competitive and 
productive indigenous firms in host countries. To examine the activities of MNEs from developing 
countries, this study investigates Chinese firms in South Africa. It reveals that in order to 
compensate for the weak brand recognition of Chinese products and to expand sales, Chinese firms 
have mainly been making products that are sold under the brand names of indigenous South 
African firms. Chinese firms have expanded their business in South Africa relying on the business 
resources of indigenous firms in the host country. This indicates that business with indigenous 
firms is significant for MNEs from developing countries in boosting competitiveness. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Outward foreign direct investment (FDI) from developing countries is increasing.1 
According to UNCTAD (2001; 2012), the ratio of outward FDI from developing 
countries to total outward FDI in the world was just 8.7% in 2000, but rose to 26.9% in 
2011. In the course of only a decade, investors of FDI have gone from being almost 
exclusively from developed countries to a sizable number now being from developing 
countries. This has made it all the more important to understand the characteristics of 
outward FDI from developing countries. 
 Among developing countries, China has become a major outward investor. 
According to a UN report (UNCTAD, 2012), the ratio of outward FDI from China to 
that from all of the developing countries was 17.0% in 2011. China’s manufacturing 
industry developed rapidly starting from the 1980s, and since the mid-1990s Chinese 
firms have had to find further growth factors, such as expanding sales in overseas 
emerging markets, developing natural resources, and enhancing their research and 
development (R&D) capabilities. Consequently they began to establish sales offices and 
factories in foreign countries to acquire a presence in overseas markets; they formed 
joint ventures with indigenous mining firms in host countries to get natural resources, 
and set up laboratories in developed countries to increase their R&D capabilities.2, 3 To 
encourage the outward FDI of Chinese firms, the Chinese government has been 
implementing a “Going out” (Zouchuqu) policy since the late 1990s. This study focuses 
on China’s outward FDI for expanding sales in order to investigate how Chinese firms 
try to realize further growth amidst the fierce competition in the global market. 
 Research on outward FDI has mainly investigated the determinants of this type 
of FDI. One of the main propositions in this research is that only competitive and 
productive firms can invest in foreign countries and become multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) (Dunning and Lundan, 2008; Helpman et al., 2004; Antràs and Helpman, 
2004).4 The reason is that outward FDI has both advantages and disadvantages for 
                                                   
1 The definition of FDI is investment having a controlling interest in an investment-grade firm, 
which in essence means acquiring more than 10% of voting common stock. 
2 The objectives of outward FDI by indigenous Chinese firms have been investigated by, among 
others, Ohashi (2003), Zhang (2009) and Buckley et al. (2007). 
3 Jiang (2011) examined outward FDI to accumulate technological capabilities in his case study 
of Huawei, a Chinese global telecommunication equipment manufacturer. 
4 Dunning and Lundan (2008) show that the OLI framework is the determinant of outward FDI. 
“OLI” combines the initials of “Ownership,” “Location” and “Internalization” advantages. The 
ownership advantage means that investors must have competitiveness, such as technology, 
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investing firms. Although investors can increase sales in host countries, at the same time 
they must bear additional costs in order to sell products in wholly unfamiliar markets. 
To put it more precisely, they must overcome the cost and time needed to learn about 
consumers’ tastes and about the information and practices of businesses in host 
countries. Therefore, MNEs must be competitive and productive to bear the additional 
costs.5 
 From this reason we can say that MNEs are champions in their own home 
countries in comparison with non-investors in the same countries. However, it cannot 
necessarily be said that every MNE is similarly competitive and productive in a host 
country. In particular, it is strongly expected that champions from developing countries 
are not as competitive and productive as those from developed countries and, in some 
cases, those in host countries. Since the main proposition in the research is on outward 
FDI, it tells us only the determinant of outward FDI from a country, not the feasibility or 
potential of outward FDI from developing countries to foreign ones, therefore we need 
to find the condition where MNEs from developing countries can survive in competition 
with more competitive and productive MNEs from developed countries as well as 
against indigenous firms in host countries.6 
 To find the condition, this study examines Chinese manufacturers of television 
sets in South Africa (SA), because they are a typical example of MNEs from developing 
countries. Chinese TV-set manufacturers use low-wage workers and make 
cost-competitive products. But while their assembling capabilities have developed to a 
high degree, they have not accumulated a similar level of capabilities in R&D.7 In the 
1990s as competition tightened in the Chinese market, some Chinese manufacturers 
begun to export and invest in overseas markets. At that time, Chinese manufacturers 
began targeting the SA market as a place to invest for the following reasons One was 
                                                                                                                                                     
management know-how and trademarks. The location advantage means that host countries must 
have advantages like low wages, raw materials and high tariff rates. The internalization 
advantage means that investors themselves have a rationality for investing because of some tacit 
knowledge and/or trade secret(s). In this study, the ownership advantage is regarded as the 
competitiveness of investors. Helpman et al. (2004) and Antràs and Helpman (2004) show that 
productive firms tend to invest and export. Their studies focused on heterogeneity among firms 
and showed that the most productive firms are investors, followed by exporters, then firms 
focusing only on domestic markets. 
5 A great number of empirical studies show that the productivity of investors is higher than that 
of non-investors. 
6 Yuan (2011) is one of the few studies focusing on competition between MNEs from 
developing countries and firms in host countries. 
7 The average productivity of indigenous firms in the electrical and electronics industry in 
China is lower than for MNEs (Kimura, 2012a). 
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that the SA market had begun to grow rapidly after the end of apartheid in the early 
1990s.8 The SA government was democratized and it eliminated racial discrimination; 
as a result, the income of black people rose, and many foreign firms, including ones 
from China, decided to enter the market and capture some of the growth. A second 
reason was that SA and China started to have economic exchanges in the early 1990s. 
The two countries did not have diplomatic relations because the Chinese Communist 
Party had relations with the African National Congress, led by Nelson Mandela, that 
opposed SA’s white government. After the transition to black leadership and 
democratization, the two countries started to have economic transactions, and they 
established diplomatic ties in 1998. The change opened the way for Chinese firms to 
export to SA and invest in the country. 
 Chinese manufacturers in SA are not as competitive and productive as MNEs 
from developed countries and indigenous SA firms. To compensate for their weakness, 
they have been producing and selling products under the brand names of indigenous SA 
firms. They do not have the power of brand recognition nor the R&D capabilities to 
differentiate their products; therefore they have depended on the brand recognition and 
sales channels of indigenous SA firms to expand sales. We will investigate the strategies 
of Chinese MNEs as an example for such firms from developing countries and seek to 
determine the condition for their survival amidst the competition in foreign markets. 
 This article is organized as follows. Section 2 gives and overview of Chinese 
firms in SA and their tariff-jumping investment. Section 3 looks at the business methods 
of Chinese manufactures in SA. The final section sets out this study’s conclusions. 
 
 
 
2. Chinese Firms in SA and Tariff-jumping Investment 
 
2.1. Overview of Chinese Firms in SA 
 
Soon after economic exchanges began taking place between China and SA in the early 
1990s, some Chinese firms took the opportunity to move into SA and built factories in 
order to expand sales. Table 1 shows the Chinese companies that have invested in SA’s 
home appliance manufacturing industry. The first investor was the SVA Group (SVA). 
                                                   
8 The SA market has continued to grow in the 2000s with the boom in natural resource. The 
country is included among the emerging countries known as the “BRICS.” 
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SVA is one of Shanghai’s state-owned enterprise (SOE). It set up operations in SA in 
1993 and as a major Chinese manufacturer, has produced TV sets, flat panel displays 
(FPD) for TVs, and various home-appliance and consumer-electronics products. 
However, SVA suffered financial difficulties and was taken over in 2009 as part of the 
Shanghai Yidian Holding (Group), which is also a Shanghai SOE, to rebuild it business. 
The company was reorganized as SVA Electronics (Pty) Ltd., and a factory was built 
near Johannesburg in 1993 to produce black and white (B&W) cathode-ray tube (CRT) 
TV sets (Lingdao Xinxi Juece, No. 26, 2008). The company produces white goods 
(appliances such as refrigerators and washing machines) and black goods, such as TV 
sets. They employ 500 workers at the factory (interview in Beijing with an official in 
the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China on June 25, 2010). 
 
Table 1 Chinese Home Appliance Manufacturers in SA 
 
Sources: Interviews with: officials in the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China 
in Beijing (June 25, 2010); employee at Konka company in Shenzhen, China (December 2, 2010); 
Professor S. Gelb in Johannesburg, SA (University of Johannessburg) (September 5, 2011); 
employee of HiFi Corp in Johannesburg, SA (September 10, 2010; Sep. 9, 2011); employee of 
Hisense in Qingdao, China (October 28, 2011). Also Gelb (2010) and other literature. 
 
 The second Chinese investor was the Hisense Group (Hisense). Hisense is an 
SOE belonging to Qingdao in Shangdong. Its predecessor was established in 1969 as a 
company producing radios. They expanded their product lineup into home appliances 
and consumer electronics, especially from the 1980s, and have become a major 
manufacturer. In the course of its rapid development, the company entered SA in 1993. 
It first chose to export its home appliances from China to SA in order to evaluate the 
potential of the SA market. Confident of the potential for growth, the company set up 
Name Headquarters Entry
year
Mode Products Remarks
SVA SOE of Shanghai 1993 Local production (1993–
present)
White goods (e.g.,
refrigerators, washing
machines), TV sets and
other electronic products
500 workers
Hisense SOE of Qingdao,
Shandong
1993 Export → Local production
(1997–present)
TV sets and other
electronic products
Purchased the SA
factory of Daewoo
(S. Korea) in 2000
XOCECO SOE of Xiamen,
Fujian
1998 Local production (?–present)
TV sets, DVD players
and other electronic
products
130 workers
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the Hisense S.A. Development Enterprise (Pty) Ltd. along with a factory near 
Johannesburg in 1997. It produces mainly TV sets. 
 The third investor was Xiamen Overseas Chinese Electronic Co. (XOCECO). 
Although they were a SOE of Xiamen, Fujian, a Taiwanese firm is the biggest 
shareholder at present. They were established in 1985. As a major manufacturer and 
exporter of TV sets, they have been developing rapidly. They established Sinoprima 
Investment & Manufacturing S. A. (PTY) LTD. near Johannesburg in 1998 to expand 
sales in SA.9 Although the year when they started local production in SA is not known, 
they have a factory for now at least. They have produced TV sets and DVD players, etc. 
They are employing 130 workers (interview with Ministry of Commerce of People’s 
Republic of China in Beijing, China, on June 25, 2010). 
 As mentioned above, these three investors are major Chinese manufacturers, 
meaning they are champions in China. Table 2 shows an abbreviated list of the top 100 
firms in China’s home appliance and information and communication technology (ICT) 
industries in 2011. The 100 firms were ranked by the Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology (MIIT) according to a comprehensive evaluation that included 
sales, profits and R&D expenditures. SVA, Hisense and XOCECO are ranked nos. 32, 6 
and 84, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
9 “Prima” in “Sinoprima” is the company’s brand name that it uses in markets other than in SA; 
in SA it goes by the brand name “Sinotec”. 
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Table 2 The Top 100 Firms in China’s Home Appliance and ICT Industry, 2011 
(abbreviated) 
 
Source: Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT). 
 
In addition to these three investors, other firms are also doing business in SA to 
expand sales. For example, Huawei, a global telecommunication equipment provider, is 
selling telecommunication equipment mainly to telecommunication carriers in SA. It 
has sales offices and technical centers in SA (interview with a Huawei employee in 
Johannesburg, SA, on September 10, 2010). Lenovo, a global personal computer (PC) 
maker, is selling PCs in the SA market. Konka is exporting TV components to Tedelex, 
an indigenous SA manufacturer. Also, TCL was exporting TV components to an 
indigenous SA manufacturer during the 2000s, but it is not known whether it is still 
doing such exporting. Konaka and TCL are also major home appliance and consumer 
electronics manufacturers. From the above discussion it can be seen that a number of 
Chinese firms have entered SA to expand sales in its growing market. 
 
Rank Name
1 Huawei
2 Lenovo
3 Haier
4 Great Wall Technology
5 ZTE
6 Hisense
7 Changhong
8 TCL
9 Founder
10 BYD
11 Panda
12 Jinglong
13 Inspur
14 Skyworth-RGB
15 Tongfang
16 Alcatel-Lucent
17 Konka…
32 SVA…
84 XOCECO…
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2.2. Tariff-jumping Investment 
 
The reason VSA, XOCECO and Hisense established factories in SA is because the 
country’s import tariffs on TV sets are very high. Table 3 shows the tariff rates of TV 
sets (finished products). When firms in countries other than the European Union (EU), 
the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) and the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) export TVs to SA, an import tariff of 25% is levied on finished 
products. TV sets are primarily classified as CRT, FPD and B&W CRT types (their 
respective classification codes are 8528.72.20, 8528.72.90 and 8528.73.20).10 On the 
other hand, TV set components can be imported almost duty free. Consequently, firms 
mainly import components and assemble them in SA. 
 
Table 3 SA’s Import Tariff Rates, 2011 (%) 
 
Source: South African Revenue Service (http://www.sars.gov.za/). 
 
 By putting high import tariffs on TV sets, the SA government has caused firms 
to establish factories in the country. However, although this protectionist policy has 
promoted local production, it has led investors to set up factories that simply assemble 
components, known as semi-knockdown (SKD) production. 11  SKD production is 
                                                   
10 TVs that are not categorized as “ordinary” TV sets are exempt from import tariffs. These 
include very small TVs, those having a screen with no side exceeding 45 cm, or very large ones, 
those having a screen size exceeding 3 m x 4 m. Moreover, all black and white TV sets are 
made using CRTs. 
11 By comparison, complete-knockdown (CKD) production is defined as the assembling of 
various components and printed-circuit boards (PCBs) that are not mounted semiconductor parts. 
Therefore firms need to mount semiconductor parts on the surface of PCBs (interview with an 
employee at Sony South Africa in Johannesburg, SA, on September 8, 2011). 
Classification Item
code General EU EFTA SADC
8528.7 TV
8528.72   Color
8528.72.20      CRT 25 3.25 13 free
8528.72.40      Other, with a screen with no side exceeding 45 cm free free free free
8528.72.50      Other, with a screen size exceeding 3 m x 4 m free free free free
8528.72.90      Other 25 3.25 13 free
8528.73   B&W
8528.73.20      CRT 25 3.25 13 free
8528.73.40      Other, with a screen with no side exceeding 45 cm free free free free
8528.73.50      Other, with a screen size exceeding 3 m x 4 m free free free free
8528.73.90      Other 25 3.25 13 free
Tariff rate
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defined as the assembling of various components and printed-circuit boards (PCBs) that 
are mounted semiconductor parts. This production takes place because the SA 
component industry has not developed, a big reason being that while TV sets imported 
as finished goods carry high tariff rates, parts and components can be imported almost 
duty free. As a result, such production does not employ many workers. The SVA and 
XOCECO factories in SA employ only 500 and 130 workers respectively, as shown in 
Table 1. 
SKD production is not limited to Chinese firms. Samsung, LG and Sony also 
just do assembling in SA. A vicious circle exists because of SA’s underdeveloped 
component industry, and thus far the government has had no success in nurturing the 
TV-set industry including the manufacturing of TV components. The government has 
begun efforts to change the scope of import tariffs to try to make manufacturers switch 
to CKD production. But SKD production has continued in SA because firms have been 
able to import TV components practically duty free (interviews with employees at 
Konka in Shenzhen, China, on December 2, 2010, and at Sony South Africa in 
Johannesburg, SA, on September 8, 2011). Therefore we will have to see how the SA 
government adjusts its tariff and trade policies and what effect that will have on the 
development of the country’s home appliance industry. 
 
 
 
3. Investors’ Operations in SA 
 
Although the three Chinese investors examined in this study are champions in China 
whose products are well-known in that country, they have been confronted in SA with 
the problem of weak brand recognition. This has been a problem for Chinese firms 
generally in overseas markets. They still lack sufficient R&D capability to differentiate 
their products and build brand recognition when compared with global champions from 
developed countries and with indigenous champions in home markets.12 Therefore they 
                                                   
12 An issue for Chinese home appliance manufacturers in SA is that were they to expand local 
production, they would lose their cost competitiveness. The monthly wage for a worker in 
Shenzhen, China, is 317 USD, but that in Johannesburg, SA, is 2,938 USD (from JETRO’s 
website [http://www.jetro.go.jp/world/search/cost/] accessed on January 29, 2013). By just 
conducting KD production with components imported duty-free, they do not lose their price 
competitiveness. This issue would apply to Chinese manufacturers conducting local production 
in other foreign countries. Thus for Chinese firms, their cost competitiveness cannot be 
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have generally bought key components from outside firms. The companies can sell their 
products under their own brand names in China where they have brand recognition. But 
when they export their products, more often than not these are sold under the brand 
names of indigenous firms. The products that they sell under their own brand names are 
mainly low-end ones. 
To compensate for this brand weakness, the three investors carry on original 
equipment manufacturing (OEM) along with selling their own brands. OEM is the 
manufacturing of products for another firm and sold under the buyer’s brand name. For 
the Chinese firms operating in SA, the buyers can be divided into two groups: 
indigenous SA manufacturers with their own brands and large indigenous SA retail 
chains that have their own private brands (PBs). The former includes such companies as 
Defy, Tedelex and AMAP. Although they are not well known in the global market, they 
are firms trusted by SA consumers. The latter group includes Pick n Pay and game. 
These two retail chains have their own PBs, AIM and LOGIC, respectively. Both have 
their own large sales channels throughout SA, therefore the Chinese investors can sell a 
lot of products through them. The buyers also have the advantage of being able to buy 
low-end products that allow them to expand their product lineup. This is very important 
for targeting the growing market of black people. Through OEM the three Chinese 
investors have been able to expand sales in SA despite their brand weakness. 
 Table 4 shows the OEM business in SA of the three Chinese investors that the 
author was able to verify. SVA makes products for Defy and Pick n Pay. Defy is a 
well-known white-goods manufacturer in SA, and the products that SVA makes for the 
company are sold under the brand name Defy. Pick n Pay is one of SA’s large retail 
chains, and SVA’s products are sold under its PB, AIM. Hisense used to make products 
for a manufacturer using the “Sansui” brand name, however this Chinese investor 
conducted no OEM business in 2011 (interview with a Hisense employee in Qingdao, 
China, on October 28, 2011). XOCECO has been making products for the large retail 
chain, game which sells them under its PB, LOGIC. In this way, the three investors have 
been doing business in their own brands together with OEM production with indigenous 
SA firms. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
separated from the low wages in China. 
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Table 4 OEM Business of the Chinese Investors 
 
Sources: The same as Table 1. 
 
Along with the OEM business, Chinese firms have been involved in supplying 
components. This has been another way that Chinese firms have been able to maintain 
their operations and expand sales in SA.13 TCL and Konka (both listed in Table 2) 
export TV components to SA manufacturers. Finished products containing these 
components are sold under the SA manufacturers’ brand names. In the early 2000s, 
Konka sold CRT TVs under its own brand in the SA market; however at present the 
company is only a component supplier. 
 As indicated in the above discussion, the share of the SA market for Chinese 
firms under their own brand names is small, but their “production share” by firm is 
much larger. In 2011 the market share by brand name in SA was as follows. For CRT 
TVs, 40% of the sets were sold by LG and Samsung (South Korea). As in other 
overseas markets, these two Korean firms account for a large share. The remainder is 
shared by Telefunken (SA), Hisense, Tedelex (SA), XOCECO and retailer PBs (SA). In 
the LCD TV market, 70% is held by Samsung, LG and Sony (Japan). The remainder is 
shared by XOCECO, Hisense, Telefunken and retailer PBs. In the CRT and LCD TV 
markets, Hisense and XOCECO have approximately 10% shares in the CRT and LCD 
TV markets. In the white-goods market (e.g., refrigerators, washing machines) 
indigenous manufacturers, notably Defy and KIC, dominate. This is because white 
goods are close to the daily lives of local consumers, and products designed by 
indigenous firms sell well. Two of the three Chinese investors have only a small share 
of the SA market; SVA has none at all. However, through their OEM business, they 
                                                   
13 There has been a case where a Chinese firm acquired by a European company entered the SA 
market under a European brand name (Kimura, 2012b). Thus although Chinese firms generally 
do not have powerful brand names, there are various ways to compensate for this problem and 
enter overseas markets. 
Name Buyer Remarks
SVA
Defy (manufacturer),
Pick n Pay (retailer)
Hisense
A manufacturer using "Sansui"
brand name
No OEM business in 2011
XOCECO game (retailer)
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make parts and components for the white goods sold by Tedelex, Defy and retailer PBs. 
 The degree of dependence on the OEM business differs among the three 
investors. SVA once emphasized business in its own brand but now depends on its OEM 
business. XOCECO is putting equal emphasis on both businesses, while Hisense’s 
emphasis is on expanding its own brand, although it also does some OEM business. The 
differing approaches of the three companies need further investigation; however it 
appears that expanding business in their own brands will be essential for the further 
growth of the three Chinese investors. From Hisense’s experience in SA, the OEM 
business has both advantages and disadvantages; therefore firms have to balance the 
business in their own brands with that in OEM (interview with an employee of Hisense 
in Qingdao, China, on October 28, 2011). Although the OEM business provides the 
investors with opportunities to expand sales, it has disadvantages. Their sales fluctuate 
with those of the buyers, and their margins are low. Since OEM sales depend on the 
performances of the buyers, it is difficult for the Chinese firms to maintain the stable 
expansion of their business. Moreover, the investors’ dependence on the brands and 
sales channels of the buyers weakens their bargaining power to control prices and 
improve profits. For these reasons, Hisense is trying to promote its own brand and not 
depend on the OEM business. 
 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This study investigated the behavior of MNEs from developing countries through an 
examination of Chinese TV-set manufacturers in SA. MNEs from developing countries 
have difficulty competing with MNEs from developed countries and with indigenous 
firms in host countries largely because MNEs from developing countries do not have 
strong brand recognition. Previous studies on the determinants of outward FDI have 
shown that competitiveness and productivity among firms in the same home countries 
are decisive for investing in foreign markets. 
 However, although weaker in competitiveness and productivity, MNEs from 
developing countries can invest and perpetuate their business overseas. As shown in the 
case of Chinese firms in SA, they can overcome deficiencies in competitiveness and 
expand sales by dealing with indigenous manufacturers and distributors who have their 
own strong brands and sales channels. 
12 
 
 This indicates that relations with indigenous firms in host countries are more 
important for MNEs from developing countries than for those from developed countries. 
While such relations are needed by MNEs from developed countries, because every 
MNE has to bear the additional costs that come with entering unfamiliar markets, these 
relations are particularly important for MNEs from developing countries, because along 
with overcoming the additional costs, these relations help them compete against 
champions from developed countries and indigenous champions in host countries. 
MNEs from developing countries, unlike those from developed countries, need to do 
business with indigenous firms in order to overcome the disadvantages of weak brand 
recognition and R&D capabilities that come with being MNEs from developing 
countries. 
 
 
 
References 
 
Antràs, Pol, and Elhanan Helpman. 2004. “Global Sourcing,” Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 112, No. 3: pp. 552–580. 
Buckley, Peter J., L. Jeremy Clegg, Adam R. Cross, Xin Liu, Hinrich Voss, and Ping 
Zhang. 2007. “The Determinants of Chinese Outward Foreign Direct 
Investment,” Journal of International Business Studies, No. 38: pp. 499–518. 
Dunning, John and Sarianna M. Lundan. 2008. Multinational Enterprises and the 
Global Economy, 2nd ed., Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Gelb, Stephen. 2010. “Foreign Direct Investment Links between South Africa & China,” 
EDGE Institute Discussion Paper. 
Helpman, Elhanan, Marc J. Melitz, and Stephen R. Yeaple. 2004. “Export Versus FDI 
with Heterogeneous Firms,” American Economic Review, Vol. 94, No. 1: pp. 
300–316. 
Jiang, Hongxiang. 2011. “Chugoku no ‘Soushutsukyo’ Seisaku to Taigai Chokusetsu 
Toshi no Sokushin: Gijutsu Kakutoku wo Chushin ni [China’s ‘Going out’ 
Policy and Promotion of Outward FDI: Focusing on Technology Acquisition],” 
Ryukoku Journal of Economic Studies, Vol. 51, No. 1: pp. 21–49 (Japanese). 
Kimura, Koichiro. 2012a. “Does Foreign Direct Investment Affect the Growth of Local 
Firms? The Case of China’s Electrical and Electronics Industry,” China & 
World Economy, Vol. 20, No. 2: pp. 98–120. 
13 
 
Kimura, Koichiro. 2012b. “Genchi Brand no Moto deno Seicho: Minami Africa no 
Chugoku Kigyo [Growth under Local Brand Names: Chinese Firms in South 
Africa],” Ajiken World Trend, Vol. 18, No. 11: pp. 24–25 (Japanese). 
Ohashi, Hideo. 2003. Internationalization of the Economy, Nagoya: The University of 
Nagoya Press. 
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development). 2001. World 
Investment Report 2001: Promoting Linkages. New York and Geneva: United 
Nations. 
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development). 2012. World 
Investment Report 2012: Towards a New Generation of Investment Policies. 
New York and Geneva: United Nations. 
Yuan, Zhijia. 2011. “India ni okeru Chugoku Kigyo no Genchi Keiei to Performance: 
Genchi Chosa niyoru Kensho [Local Management and Performance of Chinese 
Firms in India: A Verification through Field Surveys],” The 12th Annual 
Meeting of Japan Society for Chinese Management Studies (Japanese). 
Zhang, Kevin Honglin. 2009. “Rise of Chinese Multinational Firms,” The Chinese 
Economy, Vol. 42, No. 6: pp. 81–96. 
